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This paper aims to assess the effects of aid on fiscal behavior in Indonesia.  There are four 
main findings.  First, aid inflow is primarily driven by the need to fill the fiscal gap. That 
is, aid is demand driven.   Second, although project aid is by definition intended for 
development expenditures, it results in an increase in routine expenditure as well.  This 
suggests that project aid is fungible: it creates extra resources available to increase non-
discretionary spending.  Third, program aid tends to increase routine expenditure but not 
development expenditure; thus it mainly serves as budget support.  Fourth, aid flows 
make the government fiscally ￿lazy￿.  The availability of aid is a disincentive to mobilise 
domestic revenue through a more efficient and effective taxation system.  
 
Key words: Foreign aid, economic growth, balance of payments, government fiscal 
behaviour. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Foreign economic assistance is believed to have played a crucial role in Indonesia￿s 
phenomenal transformation since the early 1970s. Foreign aid to Indonesia rose steadily 
from about three per cent of GDP in 1971 and peaked at about six and a half per cent of 
GDP in 1988. Since then aid dependence declined, and the aid-GDP ratio stood at two per 
cent prior to the 1997 economic crisis. Foreign aid financed nearly 70 per cent of total 
development expenditure in 1971, dropping to about 22 per cent in 1974. It fluctuated 
between 20 and 30 per cent during the period 1975 ￿ 1985.  The contribution of foreign 
aid to development expenditure rose to about 78 per cent in 1988.  
The issue of foreign aid effectiveness has become a concern in the wake of the 
economic crisis, which saw Indonesia￿s aid dependence rise again as the aid-GDP ratio 
rose to four and a half per cent in 1999. During 1998 and 2001, over 80 per cent of 
development expenditure was financed through foreign aid. Thus, Indonesia￿s present 
scale of aid-dependence resembles that of late 1969 at the start of the New Order regime.
1 
However, the discussions have remained focused mainly on microeconomic 
aspects of management such as coordination, fiduciary standards and absorptive capacity. 
Broader macroeconomic issues such as the relationship between aid and national efforts 
in mobilising domestic resources, in particular aid￿s impact on government revenue and 
expenditure, has not received much attention from both policy makers and academic 
researchers. Nor the discussion of aid-effectiveness has been helped by the lack of any 
serious academic research.  In the words of Hill (1996, p. 81), Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  4
It is surprising ￿ that there has been no serious academic study of one of the world￿s 
largest and most successful aid programs over the past quarter-century, examining in 
detail the impact of the various aid programs and projects, and assessing the importance 
of expatriate economic policy advice from the World Bank, the Harvard group, and other 
organizations. 
The discussion of aid effectiveness is further complicated by a lack of consensus in the 
wider literature. This paper, thus, seeks to fill the research gap in the Indonesian context 
and in the process will shed light on the debate.  
This study focuses on the fiscal response of aid rather than aid-growth relationship for 
three reasons.  First, at least for the Indonesian case, there seems to be no strong 
correlation between aid and growth (see Figure 1).  Various regression models have been 
constructed to establish the relationship, but the results were very unsatisfactory.  This 
rises a concern whether aid has been effective in stimulating growth. 








-2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
AID/ GDP
GROWTH
 Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  5
Second, after more than 30 years of engagement with donors, Indonesia has not been able 
to reduce its dependence on foreign assistance. It is an irony that Indonesia with a 
domestic savings rate of about 27 to 30 per cent of GDP, remained one of the most 
indebted nations.  In fact, the country had to ask rescheduling of its debt repayment 
through the Paris Club (PC) three times.  The question is then: has Indonesia fallen in to a 
debt trap?   
Third, in almost all difficult circumstances, Indonesia had to seek foreign assistance. For 
example, foreign assistance played a significant role in overcoming Indonesia￿s 
difficulties in the late 1960s and early 1970s when aid financed nearly 80 per cent of 
development expenditure.  Foreign assistance also helped to ease the difficulties faced in 
the mid 1980s after the collapse of oil prices.  Certainly, it also cushioned against the 
adverse economic situation during the late 1990s crisis.  This leads us to a hypothesis that 
the nation has no internal mechanism to deal with adverse economic shocks. If this the 
case, the question is then: why?  
One possible answer to the above questions is that the easy access to foreign 
assistance made the Seoharto regime lazy and it was lax in its revenue efforts. By treating 
aid as revenue in the government budget, the regime could hide the fiscal deficit and 
remain profligate. Thus, while the household sector was saving at a fantastic rate, the 
government was in fact dissaving under the disguise of fiticiously achieved balanced 
budgets, made possible by high inflows of aid treated as revenue.  
In light of the above, it is imperative that the paper examines aid￿s impact on government 
expenditure and revenue. The paper is organised as follows: Section II provides a brief Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  6
review of literature as a background to this study; Section III describes the empirical 
model; Section IV reflects on the close association between budget deficits and aid flows; 
Section V analyses the effects of aid on public expenditures and non-oil revenues. The 
final section contains policy implications of the findings. 
II. Aid-effectiveness: a brief review of literature 
There have been extensive researches in this area for more than thirty years. Much of this 
research has been dominated by empirical test of whether aid contributed to economic 
growth using cross-country data.
2  The theoretical foundation for the empirics originated 
from the two-gap model of Chenery and Bruno (1962) and Chenery and Strout (1966): 
developing countries have deficient level of domestic saving to finance a level of 
investment necessary to achieve a desired rate of economic growth, and/or limited foreign 
exchange reserves to acquire imported capital goods.  These savings and foreign 
exchange gaps constraint growth, and foreign aid can fill these gaps.   
The empirics of aid-growth relationships have not achieved a solid consensus 
from the very beginning. The early studies of the relationship between aid and savings 
produced contradictory conclusions. For example, Rahman (1968), Griffin (1970) and 
Griffin and Enos (1970) found a negative relationship between aid and domestic savings, 
whereas Papanek (1972; 1973) and Kennedy and Thirlwall (1971) broadly supported the 
positive view of the Chenery-Bruno-Strout hypthesis. Among the more recent studies, the 
influential works by Mosley et al (1987; 1991) and Boone (1994; 1996) found 
insignificant effect of aid on growth.
3  On the other hand, based on a study of 31 Sub-
Saharan African countries, Hadjimichael et al (1995) suggested that aid significantly Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  7
affect the growth rate, as do a number of policy variables (government investment, human 
capital, population growth, terms of trade, real effective exchange rate, and the budget 
deficit). Similarly, Durbarry et al (1998), drawing on a larger sample of 58 countries 
(1970-93), provided robust evidence that greater foreign aid inflows have a beneficial 
impact on growth, as again do several policy/economic variables (domestic saving, 
private net inflows, terms of trade, inflation and the budget deficit).  
The much cited Burnside-Dollar study (1997) concluded that aid works only in 
countries with ￿right￿ policies in place.
4  Right policies are defined as low inflation, small 
budget deficits, openness to trade, strong rule of law and a competent bureaucracy. The 
Burnside-Dollar (BD) study generated much interests and influenced policy makers both 
at the multilateral and bilateral levels. However, the critics claim that the methodology of 
BD study is seriously flawed, and Easterly et al (2003) expressed alarms at the influence 
of  the BD study at the policy level. 
The main deficiency of aid-growth studies is that they ignores a simple fact that 
aid is primarily channeled through the budget of the recipient countries (McGillivray, 
2000; 2002).   Thus the ultimate impact of aid on the economy will by and large depend 
on how aid affects public expenditures and revenues.  If aid is mostly directed to finance 
public investment rather than consumption and it does not substitute tax revenues, then 
aid-growth co-movement may be clearly observed.  Some of recent works have focused 
on this strand of reasoning. Following the seminal work of Heller (1975), Mosley et al 
(1987), Gang and Khan (1991; 1999), and Franco-Rodriguez (2000) modelled the 
interaction between aid flows and various categories of public expenditures and 
revenues.
5  Others like Swaroop et al (2000) and Feyzioglu et al (1998) used the Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  8
framework of McGuire (1978), and focused on fungibility issue, that is whether aid is 
directed toward its intended purposes. These studies reveal that the impacts of aid on 
fiscal behaviour vary across countries. In some, aid did not lead to a reduction in revenue 
raising efforts and aid was not diverted to unproductive uses. However, studies also found 
that aid was diverted away from its intended purpose. Some studies found that aid had a 
positive impact on public investment but negative impact on tax efforts; others found 
very small impacts of aid on public sector fiscal behaviour.  
The only academic study of the aid-fiscal behaviour relationship in Indonesia is by 
Pack and Pack (1990). This study used a McGuire type model of aid fungibility, and 
found that foreign aid between 1966 and 1986 did not displace development expenditure; 
instead aid stimulated total public expenditure. Pack and Pack further found that most 
categorical aid was spent on the purposes intended by donors. More importantly, their 
findings revealed that aid did not lead to a reduction in domestic revenue. Thus, this study 
provided an over all positive assessment of foreign aid.  However, the findings are a bit 
odd given the continued rise in aid-GDP ratio during this period. 
 
III. Empirical model 
 
The empirical model of public sector fiscal response to aid used in the study follows the 
model advanced by Franco-Rodriguez et al (1998) and McGillivray (2002).  The main 
difference is that the response is established within a vector autoregression (VAR) 
framework, enabling us to fully capture the dynamics of aid-fiscal inter-relationships.    In 
a VAR representation, the interrelationships can be specified as follow: Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  9
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where  t Z  is a vector of aid and fiscal variables and  t ε  is a gaussian error term.  Aid is 
disaggregated into two components; project and program aid.  Fiscal variables include 
non-oil tax revenue, development and routine expenditures.  Thus  t Z  is a vector of five 
variables. 
The above representation treats that aid and fiscal behaviour as interdependent.  
An adverse shock on fiscal side will have follow up impacts on aid. For example, a fall in 
domestic revenue may generate the need to increase aid inflows.  In exchange, there 
should be feed back effects from aid - the availability of aid may reduce the need to adjust 
the budget both from revenue and expenditure sides.  Thus, rather than a uni-directional 
relationship, aid and fiscal interact in a dynamic manner. 
The above representation is slightly different from the original model of 
McGillivray (2002).   In his model, the variables are separated into target (planed) and 
actual (realization), where in a reduced equation format it turns out that a particular 
realisation is a function of all target variables.  This is problematic especially when target 
data are not available. McGillivray, in fact, estimates the target as a function of past 
realisation.  In effect, current realisation is indirectly a function of past realisation.  This is 
a relatively perfect case of vector autoregression (VAR) model.  Thus rather than going 
into a cumbersome methodology (like McGillivray), it is more convenient to directly use 
VAR as an empirical model. Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  10
Moreover, with a VAR representation it becomes easy to assess the effect of a 
particular shock on all variables by using the so called impulse response analysis (IRA). It 
traces the effect on the system of an exogenous shock to one of the variables in the 
model.  The effect of any unexpected shock to the system can be traced through 
deviations of the shocked time paths from the expected time path given by the model.  
This technique is quite useful in certain types of policy and sensitivity analyses.  The 
procedure to obtain an impulse response function from a VAR can be outlined as follows.   
Assumes that Π  is not a full-rank matrix, the solution of (1) involves common stochastic 
trends, and is given by: 
   ) )( ( * ) 1 ( 0 0 h h L C S C Z Z t t t − + + =        (2) 
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* = i C  for i<0.  Matrix C(1) can be obtained 
directly such that: Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  11
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The matrices,  i Φ  can be obtained from coefficient matrices such that: 
   1 1 I Γ + Π − = Φ  
   1 − Γ − Γ = Φ i i i ,          i= 1, 2, ￿.,p-1 
   1 − Γ − = Φ p p  
 Let 
* ) 1 ( i i C C A + = , and  i A can be obtained recursively as: 
   p p i i i i A A A Φ + + Φ = − − ......... 1 ,        for i=1,2,￿.. (5) 
where I 0 = A ,  ) 1 ( lim C Ai i =
∞ → , and  0 = i A  for i<0. 
Let Σ be the covariance matrix of the innovation,  t ε , and  ij σ  be the component of the 
matrix.  For a shock in variable i, it is necessary to define the size of the shock and an 
1Xm matrix,  ) 0 ...., 1 ,...., 0 ( = i e  where the i-th component of the matrix is set to 1, while 
other components are set to zero.   The size of the shock is usually set such that 
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where i=1,2,..m; j=1,2, ..,r  and N=1,2,￿. . 
The above impulse response function will be used to assess fiscal effects of aid.   Note 
that, in McGillivray￿s model fiscal responses is captured by analysing the coefficients of Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  12
aid variables in the fiscal equations.  This technique, does not allow for inter-temporal 
dynamic effects.  In contrast, IRA stresses on the dynamics. 
IV. Aid and budget deficits 
Perhaps, the very reason for obtaining foreign loans is to fill the fiscal gap. As can be 
seen from Figure 2, aid flows almost mirror the size of government budget deficits. The 
fact that there is a strong correlation between aid flows and budget deficits opens up two 
possibilities. 





























Note: Deficit (+); Surplus (-) 
First, aid may be demand driven. That is, the government intentionally creates a deficit 
due to various reasons and then seeks to fill the deficit by aid.  Second, aid can be supply 
driven and therefore induce a deficit.  The latter case represents donors￿ interests more 
than the debtor interests.
6 
In order to assess whether net aid inflow to Indonesia was driven by the necessity 
to fill the fiscal gap, the ￿Granger causality test￿ is employed.  The test suggests that Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  13
budget deficits cause net aid flows which indicates that the size of the deficits determine 
the size of net aid inflows (see Table 1).  In other words, the government planned the 
deficit in the first place, and then negotiated with creditors to fill the intended deficit. 
Table 1: The Results of Causality Test 
Causality    
From  To  Test Statistics  Prob (df=5, sl=0.05) 
Net Aid Flows  Budget Deficit  5.441  0.367 
Budget Deficit  Net Aid Flows  11.735  0.047 
 
We also use the causality test to assess whether there was a reverse causality between 
fiscal deficits and aid flows.  The test shows that net aid flows did not cause fiscal 
deficits, and therefore there was no strong evidence that aid was supply driven.  But this 
does not mean that creditors has no interest in directing aid to certain activities that meet 
their objectives in providing loans.   Rather, it says that aid is made available upon 
demand (request) by the government of Indonesia.    
These findings suggest that it is up to the government of Indonesia to create or 
close the fiscal gap.  Over the period of analysis, fiscal policy stance of the government 
was mainly expansionary and only in a few occasions during the first half of the 1990s 
the government created fiscal surpluses.  The creation of deficit was probably motivated 
by the need to stimulate the economy by means of increasing public expenditure.  The 
increase in public expenditure was very difficult to be match by tax revenue in a situation 
where the domestic taxation regime was very rudimentary.  There was no serious attempt Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  14
to overhaul the complicated tax administrative structures, some inherited from the Dutch 
colonial era, and to ensure tax compliance. The collection process was inefficient and 
corrupt.   It was only after a significant decline in oil revenue that provided the initial 
stimulus for tax reforms in 1984 and a decade of continuing low oil prices ensured that 
these reforms were actually implemented seriously.
7 A series of tax reforms, first 
implemented in 1984-1985, attempted to produce a more efficient and buoyant tax 
system.  The results of these reforms were impressive.  In 1984, non oil development 
revenue contributed to about 30 per cent of total government revenue.  In 1996, just 
before the crisis, the share increased to 68 per cent.   
With this improvement, why did the government continuously rely on aid? More 
puzzling is, with a relatively high domestic saving, why was foreign financing found to be 
more attractive than domestic borrowings? 
There are five reasons for this. First, financing the deficit through commercial 
domestic market may be difficult when the market is underdeveloped. Before the crisis, 
the size of the market was only about IDR 6 trillion.
8  Second, obtaining concessionary 
loans from bilateral and multilateral donors can reduce financial cost.  Government 
projects are typically less commercially oriented than that of private, and therefore it is 
more reasonable to seek funds with the actual cost below the market rate.  Besides, the 
financial terms from non commercial sources is generally favourable; lower interest rate 
and longer repayment period.  For instance, in 1999, the average interest rate of official 
creditors was only about 3.8 per cent per annum, with average maturity about 16.7 years, 
grace period of about 5.2 years, and the grant element of the total aid was about 38.1 per 
cent (see Table 2).
9   Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  15
Table 2: Average Terms of Aid 
  1970 1980 1990 1995 1997 1999 
Interest  (%)  2.4 5.4 5.6 5.1 6.3 3.8 
Maturity  (years)  35.9 25.5 23.1 21.3 19.5 16.7 
Grace  period  (years)  9.5 7.3 6.6 5.8 4.9 5.1 
Grant  element  (%) 62.9 36.2 32.8 33.3 22.7 38.1 
 
Third, even if domestic bond market is relatively sizeable, aid financing is still 
more attractive when the government wants to avoid crowding out effects of budget 
deficit.  The deficit can directly reduce private investment through the increase in 
domestic interest rate.  However, the adverse impact of aid financing on the private sector 
may not be fully contained when it leads to a real exchange rate appreciation.
10       
Fourth, aid can also avoid inflationary financing of budget deficits by means of 
printing money.  This was indeed the main success story of aid and technical assistance to 
Indonesia in the late 1960s and 1970s.  The run away inflation during 1973-1974 and 
again during the crisis of 1998 was successfully scraped in just a few years (Figure 3).
11  
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Fifth, in a crisis situation, aid could play a more significant role in preserving 
fiscal sustainability and sustaining growth.  With the economy entering the down turn, tax 
revenue falls.  In such circumstances, the need to stimulate growth can be facilitated by 
creating an aid financed fiscal deficit.  By doing so, the cut in public expenditure which 
tend to propagate the crisis can be avoided. 
Because the aid was by and large found to be demand driven, there is a need to 
assess whether it was used effectively, or whether it was directed towards productive 
activities that can stimulate growth and increase the capacity to repay the debt at the same 
time.  The following section discusses the fiscal response to aid. 
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V. Fiscal Response  
Effects on government spending 
In order to assess the impacts of net aid flows on government spending, an impulse 
response function (IRF) analysis is employed.  Aid is classified into two categories, 
project and program aid, and each category should have different impacts on different 
types of government expenditure.   Project aid is usually directed to finance development 
expenditure; and therefore it can be expected that an increase in the disbursement of 
project aid will tend to induce a higher level of development expenditure.  The impact of 
project aid on routine expenditure will depend on whether it is fungible or not.  If it is not 
fungible, routine expenditure should not increase. On the other hand, it is natural to 
expect that program aid is fungible.  Program aid is typically used in a hard time, mainly 
to maintain the essential social and routine expenditure. In other words, program aid 
comes as budget supports. 
The results of impulse response analysis (IRA) are displayed in Figures 4 and 5.  
Two shocks are exercised; one standard deviation shocks on project and program aid.  
The figures display the response of fiscal variables to the shocks.  The responses are 
measured in terms of deviations from the expected time paths.  A positive value indicates 
that the variable in question will increase due to a given shock.  The effect can be either 
transitory or permanent.  The effect will be transitory if the response, which can be 
initially either positive or negative, stabilises at zero in the latter periods.  The effect is 
said to be permanent if it stabilises at a value below or above zero. 
   Figure 4 indicates that a one standard deviation shock on project aid will lead to 
increases in both development and routine expenditure, permanently.  However, it has Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  18
stronger effect on routine expenditure compared to the other.  This means that the 
availability of project aid provides free resources to increase routine spending.  In other 
words, project aid is fungible.  This finding is contrary to Pack and Pack (1990). 
 
Figure 4: Effects of one standard deviation shock of project aid on development and 
expenditures and non-oil revenue. 
Effect of one standard deviation shock of PROJECT AID on development and














Figure 5 suggests that a one standard deviation shock on program aid will lead to 
increases in routine expenditure and decreases in development expenditure.  In a difficult 
time, it is understandable that the objective of obtaining program aid is to preserve 
routine expenditure, the bulk of which is unavoidable like salary and wages.  However, 
the interpretation of the responses of development expenditure needs caution.  The Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  19
decline in development expenditure may not be due to the availability of program aid.  
Rather it is a necessary adjustment in a crisis situation when the program aid comes. 
Hence, there is a negative correlation between program aid and development expenditure. 
 
Figure 5: Effect of one standard deviation shock of program aid on development 
and expenditures and non-oil revenue. 
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In sum, it is found that aid is mainly used to preserve an intended level of routine 
expenditure, rather than development expenditure. In addition, aid is fungible: aid 
provides additional resources to be used for consumptive purpose.  Thus, it is not so 
surprising that a strong correlation between aid flows and growth does not exist.   To the Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  20
extent that aid is not directed to increase spending on productive purposes or to support 
productive activities, on which government revenue largely depends, debt repayment may 
become a serious problem. The increase in debt burden needs to be matched with 
increasing tax efforts.  Thus, we investigate the impact of aid on government￿s revenue 
raising efforts. 
 
Effects of aid on non-oil domestic revenue (NODR) 
 
In this section, we are going to assess the impact of the availability of project and 
program loans on government￿s tax efforts.  The analysis is facilitated by impulse 
response functions presented in Figures 4 and 5.  Note that the capacity of the government 
to raise fund domestically is represented by non-oil development revenues (NODR).  Oil 
revenue is excluded because the production level of oil is determined through quota of the 
OPEC.  Hence the revenue from oil production sharing is not related to government 
￿effort￿ to raise tax. 
As can be seen from Figures 4 and 5, both program and project aid has a small 
adverse impact on NODR over the long run.  Thus, it can be said that aid acquisition is 
not followed by improvement in the government revenue.  This is a relatively a surprising 
result, given that program aid generally imposes structural reforms including 
improvement in the taxation system.  One possible explanation for this unexpected result 
is that tax reform was never been part of conditionality of any structural adjustment loans 
(SALs) from the World Bank and the IMF.  In fact, the 1987 World Bank￿s Adjustment 
Loan was approved entirely on the basis of reforms already done.
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treatment might have adversely impacted on fiscal behaviour. That is, the government did 
not have any incentive to further reform the taxation system. From 1990 to 1996, indeed, 
the tax - non-oil GDP ratio remained stagnant at about 10.4 per cent, indicating that there 
was no substantial attempt to improve tax efforts.  Hill (1996, p.47) noted, ￿￿  
notwithstanding the gradual decline in the importance of aid after 1988, Indonesia has not 
yet achieved one of its major fiscal objectives, that of reduced dependence on foreign 
aid￿. Hill (1996) concluded, oil revenues and steady flows of aid have made the 
Indonesian government lazy to collect tax from non-oil sectors.  Every time the 
government ran into a budget deficit, the donors filled the financing gap. Thus the 
government had little incentive to increase its capacity to raise fund from domestic 
sources.
13 
VI. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
This paper aims to assess the effects of aid on fiscal behavior. There are four main 
findings worth to be highlighted. First, the aid flow is generally demand driven in the 
sense that it is a result of a continuous lax fiscal regime.  It is created by the desire to fill 
the fiscal gap.  However, this does not suggest that aid agencies play a passive role.  The 
fact that the government can always obtain aid - with size almost equal to the deficit - 
suggest that the supply of aid is always made available upon request.  Moreover, the 
agencies can also have interest in directing aid allocation for specific purposes that meet 
the donor interest. Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  22
Second, although project aid is by definition intended to finance development 
expenditures, it results in an increase in routine expenditure as well. This suggests that 
project aid is fungible: it creates extra resources available to increase non-discretionary 
spending.  Thus, the effectiveness of project aid in stimulating growth through an increase 
in public investment is jeopardised. 
Third, program aid tends to increase routine expenditure but not development 
expenditure.  Thus, this aid only serves as a buffer to maintain a certain level of routine 
expenditure.  In times of economic hardship, fiscal revenue usually declines and thus the 
dependence on aid revenue increases.  This also suggests that the economy has no internal 
mechanism on the fiscal side to deal with economic downturns.  Persistent budget deficits 
over a long period before a crisis, makes no fiscal resources available to exercise a ￿fine 
tune￿ policy mix. 
Fourth, aid flows make the government is fiscally ￿lazy￿.  The availability of aid 
is a disincentive to expand domestic revenue through a more efficient and effective 
taxation system.  In five years leading to the Asian crisis, the tax ratio remained constant 
at about 10.4 per cent despite the fact that that period is characterized by economic boom, 
which is favourable for increasing tax effort. 
Our findings suggest that the government has to reduce its dependence on aid.  In 
the longer term, the objective of the government should not be just filling the fiscal gap, 
but actually to create a fiscal discipline. Closing the fiscal gap can be attained by 
increasing government revenues and improving expenditure management. However, the 
dilemma is that the arithmetic of closing the fiscal gap: increasing tax and lowering Aid and Fiscal Behaviour in Indonesia  23
expenditures, is not very simple.  Public investment may be very crucial for sustaining 
growth, and increasing tax may not be an easy task.   Thus, where public expenditure 
cannot be cut, taxation cannot be simply increased, as it requires an overhaul of the 
taxation system.  Such an overhaul may take time to be fully effective. At the same time, 
both widening of tax base and cutting of public expenditure face strong political 
resistance. Therefore, over the short run, the government may still have to rely on aid 
inflows to finance public investment and on rescheduling and debt forgiveness to lower 
the debt burden. Hence, the donors and the government will have to cooperate in a 
constructive manner in the foreseeable future. 
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1 Nearly 80% of development budget of 1969/70 fiscal year was financed through foreign aid. See Hill 
(1996, Figure 4.3, p. 46). 
2 See Tarp (ed.) (2000) for a comprehensive survey of aid-effectiveness literature. White (1992) is a useful 
critical survey of macroeconomic impact of aid. Also see Symposia in Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics 2003, Economic Journal, vol. 114 (June, 2004), and International Review of 
Economics & Finance, vol. 13 (2004) for most recent and comprehensive discussions of issues pertaining to 
aid effectiveness and aid allocations.  
3 Boone￿s results are described as ￿surprising￿ by Tsikata (1998) and his approach is criticised by Hansen 
and Tarp (2000). 
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Burnside-Dollar were reviewed under the title, ￿Making Aid Work￿ (The Economist, Nov. 14, 1998).  Aid 
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and influenced policy makers both at the multilateral and bilateral levels. However, the critics claim that the 
methodology of BD study is seriously flawed, and Easterly et al (2003) expressed alarms at the influence of  
the BD study at the policy level. Easterly (2003) expressed doubt about the soundness of policy contingent 
lending. 
5 See also Khan and Hoshino (1992), McGillivray and Morrissey (2000; 2001) and White (1994).  
6 Easterly (2003) has argued that donors are judged by the amount money spent and hence are driven by the 
desire to ￿move money￿. According to him, Judith Tendler￿s observation as far back in 1975 that ￿A donor 
organization￿s sense of mission ￿ relates not necessarily to economic development but to the commitment 
of resources, the moving of money￿￿ remains valid even today. 
7 Hill (1996) and Gillis (1985) 
8 After the crisis, although the government has issued bonds amounted to IDR 660 trillion as a result of 
bank bailout, only IDR 35 trillion is actively traded in the market.  Hence, it would be difficult for the 
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9 However, this favourable financial terms has to be compensated by non-financial conditionality such as 
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10 Gray and Woo (2000) 
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12 Mosley et al (1991) 
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